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Abstract—With the advent of the smart energy grid – 
an energy transportation and distribution network being 
combined with an IT network for its monitoring and 
control – information security has gained tremendous 
importance for energy distribution and energy automa-
tion systems. Integrated security functionality is crucial to 
ensure a reliable and continuous operation of the smart 
energy grid. Further security related challenges arise 
from the integration of millions of smart homes into the 
smart grid. This paper gives an overview of the smart 
energy grid environment and its challenges. Many future 
use cases are centered around the smart home, using an 
ICT gateway. Approaches to protect the access and data 
exchange are described, preventing manipulation of ICT 
gateway operation. The paper presents ASIA – an Au-
thentication, Session Invocation, and Authorization com-
ponent to be used in the smart energy grid, to protect ICT 
gateways and to cope with problems like ICT gateway 
discovery and ICT gateway addressing.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Power generation, transmission, and distribution sys-
tems are characterized by the existence of two parallel 
infrastructures, the electrical grid carrying the energy, 
and the information and communication infrastructure 
used to automate, control and supervise the electrical 
grid. Especially the latter is becoming more and more 
one of the essential parts for power system operations 
as it is responsible not only for retrieving information 
from field equipment but most importantly for transmit-
ting control commands. The power system as a critical 
infrastructure requires integrated protection against 
intentional attacks. A highly dependable management 
and operation of the information infrastructure is a 
prerequisite for a highly reliable energy network as the 
power system relies on the availability of the informa-
tion infrastructure. Therefore the information infra-
structure must be operated according to the same level 
of reliability as required for the stability of the power 
system infrastructure to prevent any type of outage. 
Integrated security functionality is therefore a central 
part of the energy control network. 
Today’s rather centralized approach for power gen-
eration has already and will continue to evolve into a 
decentralized power generation involving existing 
power plants, power plants producing renewable en-
ergy (like wind parks) down to households having their 
own micro power plants (e.g., solar cells). The impor-
tance of decentralized energy generation is expected to 
increase in the future due to the efforts to reduce the 
CO2 footprint to fight global warming. Introducing 
decentralized energy generators into the current energy 
distribution network poses great challenges for energy 
automation (EA) in the smart grid scenario, especially 
secure communication between a control station (e.g., 
substation) and equipment of users (e.g., decentralized 
energy generators) must be addressed. Another trend in 
energy automation networks is the extended focus on 
the customer/user. From an architectural approach, 
users are expected to connect to the smart grid or more 
specific to the information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) infrastructure of the smart grid using an 
ICT gateway, which on the one hand provides metering 
data to the meter management service based on the 
locally measured and accumulated data. On the other 
hand, the ICT gateway also receives commands for 
load reductions to avoid power demand peaks. Addi-
tionally, an interface for the user to control certain 
home appliances or loads from remote location is 
needed. The ICT gateway may also be connected to a 
market place to sell locally generated energy or get 
price signals indicating a low price for energy, which 
can be coupled with profiles for dedicated energy con-
sumers. All these new services require a way for smart 
grid participants (e.g., distribution network provider, 
energy provider, marketplace, meter data management) 
to discover ICT gateways. Once discovered the secure 
connectivity to the user’s home energy gateway pro-
vides the base for secure service provisioning and se-
cure information exchange. Security comes in different 
flavors here, as at least authentication and authorization 
are required, to reliably control access to the ICT gate-
way and thus to secure energy appliances. Based on the 
required security level, integrity and privacy protection 
can leverage the initial security interaction. This sup-
ports also security requirements from different regula-
tion bodies (examples are provided in [6] and [7]). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section II provides an overview of smart grid chal-
lenges with respect to security in general and describes 
in two subsections the end user and the utility perspec-
tive. Section III builds on that and describes security 
considerations to be obeyed when designing a secure 
access solution to home energy appliances. Section IV 
afterwards provides three different approaches to se-
curely connect to the ICT gateway, whereby security is 
related to authentication and authorization of accessing 
peers. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. CHALLENGES IN THE SMART GRID 
Current challenges for the power grid include the in-
tegration of fluctuating renewable energy sources, 
distributed power generation, short interval feedback 
on users on their energy usage, user indicated demand 
peaks, and the foreseeable need for the integration of 
electric vehicles, leading to an even higher energy 
demand of customers at peak times. A “smarter” grid 
can meet many of these challenges. With the move to a 
smart grid the importance of IT communication tech-
nologies in energy automation rises. With the availabil-
ity of pervasive IT communication services, a variety 
of new use cases becomes possible enhancing the ser-
vice to end customers and mitigates the impact of the 
challenges mentioned above.  
Many use cases center around the Smart Home sce-
nario. Smart Home in combination with the Smart Grid 
will allow people to understand how their household 
uses energy by smart metering, manage energy use 
better, e.g., through dynamic pricing or time of use 
pricing. Moreover, it enables them to sell locally gen-
erated energy on a market place, and reduce their car-
bon footprint. As the energy automation standard IEC 
61850 (cf. [1]) is already used in the backend of energy 
automation networks, IEC 61850 is a good candidate to 
be used for communication between instances of the 
Smart Grid and the gateway of a Smart Home. The 
standard IEC 62351 (cf. [2] and [4]) defines security 
functions to protect IEC 61850 communication. The 
availability of an established security standard supports 
the approach to use IEC 61850 for communication 
between instances of the Smart Grid and the gateway of 
a Smart Home. 
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Figure 1: Connection of households to the smart grid 
Figure 1 shows an example of a generic system ar-
chitecture for a smart energy grid:  
− Homes are equipped with smart meters, intelligent 
household devices, and energy producers. 
− Home gateways control the communication be-
tween these entities within a home and with the 
smart grid and thus define a security perimeter. The 
ICT gateway hides the complexity of the in-house 
network from the smart grid. Moreover, by acting 
as a gateway, it also protects the user’s privacy, in 
terms of installed devices, network topology, and 
the generated data, when communicating with other 
smart grid entities. The ICT gateway may also act 
as a proxy for the appliances of the home. An ex-
ample is a connection to the energy market place 
typically requiring communication in both direc-
tion, initiated by the household and the market 
place.  
− A gateway operator is responsible for administra-
tion of the ICT gateways and provides connectivity 
for smart grid participants to the ICT gateways. As 
he controls the connectivity to the ICT gateway, a 
gateway operator may also provide centralized au-
thorization functions for the ICT gateway. This also 
includes the user himself, when remotely control-
ling his household equipment. 
− The distribution network operator is likely to com-
municate with the ICT gateways via the gateway 
operator, which hides the complexity of the ICT 
gateway management from the distribution network 
operator. 
− The Meter Data Management processes the infor-
mation received from the smart meters and provides 
the processed information to other market partici-
pants, e.g., for accounting. 
− At the energy market, prosumers (resp. their ICT 
gateways) may buy and also sell energy. Hence the 
market offers a demand regulated price. An energy 
market alleviates the integration of distributed en-
ergy generators (e.g. solar cells). 
− The smart grid information and communication 
infrastructure is also the enabler for other value 
added services. Remote serviceability of household 
equipment is just one example. 
The functionality depicted can only be realized if 
two main issues are solved: one is the addressability 
through external entities (e.g. the Distribution Network 
Operator) - the ICT gateways must be reachable by 
external entities. The second, after being reachable, 
access to the ICT gateways must be restricted to a 
distinct group of people, like the market place sending 
offers, a smart grid operator sending commands to the 
gateway, or the user accessing the gateway remotely in 
order to meet security and privacy requirements.  
A. Consumer Perspective: Smart Home 
Having an information and communication infra-
structure like this at hand, the following use cases can 
be supported in the user environment: 
1) Energy-aware home appliances 
Currently, the price of energy for private consumers 
is mostly constant. From the perspective of a utility it 
would be beneficial to have dynamic pricing to influ-
ence the energy usage of customers; therefore it is 
likely that there will be dynamic pricing in the near 
future. On the customer side, new intelligent, energy-
aware home appliances can optimize the costs for en-
ergy usage by starting and stopping energy extensive 
tasks (e.g., cloth or dish washing, charging an electric 
car) at appropriate times (e.g., start when energy is 
cheap). This requires that the current price of energy is 
known and there is some way to determine the price of 
energy for the duration of an operation. One way to 
implement such a system is an energy market, where 
energy-aware home appliances buy a certain amount of 
energy before they start an operation. Especially charg-
ing a private electrical car during the night is an ex-
tremely flexible operation that requires much energy 
but has a large time window for execution, hence bene-
fits from a good deal. 
To integrate this functionality with the architecture 
presented above, the ICT gateway trades energy at the 
energy market. Accounting for any contract on the 
energy market includes the energy provider as well as 
the meter data management. 
2) Distributed power generation 
If energy is produced in a customer’s home, e.g., by 
solar cells, the energy not needed at that point in time 
can be either stored or traded on an energy market. 
Especially if the energy market is on a large scale, 
selling the energy with dynamic pricing may be more 
attractive than fixed pricing. On the other hand, energy 
markets may be restricted to a smaller geographical 
area (e.g., city district) thus, energy can be locally 
distributed in the first place, supporting self-
containment of that area. 
As for the scenario above, the ICT gateway is con-
nected with external smart grid entities to trade energy. 
Accounting for contracts includes the distribution net-
work provider as well as the smart meter management. 
3) Energy Management and User Awareness 
An application with integrated user interface in the 
home is used for communication with the utility, e.g., 
to get a diagram of current energy usage, to get current 
energy pricing, to get the personal energy usage his-
tory, to get energy saving tips and the like. The user 
interface may also be used to receive energy outage 
forecasts, for troubleshooting, or to dynamically select 
a desired energy mix. 
Even energy-aware home appliances may offer a 
user interface that states the current price for one op-
eration execution. E.g. a coffee machine may state the 
price per coffee pot or the washing machine may sug-
gest a different start time to save money because of a 
better tariff. 
To implement this use case with the architecture pre-
sented above, the ICT gateway informs appliances 
about current energy prices, which it either gets at the 
energy market or directly from the energy provider 
(price signals as special incentive for a special behav-
ior). 
B. Utility Perspective 
Further use cases are focused on keeping the distri-
bution network stable and keeping costs for utilities 
low (e.g., because it is not necessary to buy additional 
energy at short notice). As IEC 61850 is already wide-
spread in use in the distribution network, it is a natural 
candidate for the following use cases: 
1) Reactive shutoff of home appliances 
A utility has the ability to shut down certain home 
appliances in the household of users to react on certain 
situations in the network (e.g., if too many consumers 
are active). In doing so, the utility avoids buying en-
ergy on short notice, which is very expensive (prices 
may go up to 100 Euros per kWh). The ability and 
permission to issue switch-off commands to a user’s 
home can be based on special contracts between user 
and utility operator. As the ICT gateway provides a 
security perimeter, it hides the internal energy con-
sumer network from the utility.   
To implement this use case with the architecture pre-
sented above, the utility must only have a certain 
amount of energy (kilowatt hours), which can be 
unloaded in households as well as the communication 
addresses of the associated ICT gateways. In the archi-
tecture above, ICT gateways may be addressed through 
the gateway operator that also ensures the connectivity 
of the ICT gateways. The utility sends a shutoff mes-
sage via the gateway operator to a set of ICT gateways. 
Sending this shutoff message to many households must 
be finished in a short time to allow fast reactions. The 
shutoff message must be protected to avoid being mis-
used by attackers. The ICT gateway takes the appropri-
ate actions to meet the request of the utility, especially, 
it communicates with proper appliances to be shut off. 
2) Shutoff of power generator 
The utility may not only tear down energy consump-
tion, it may also instruct distributed power generators 
to not feed energy to the distribution network to fight 
situations when there is a low demand for energy. The 
signaling process is the same as in the previous use 
case. Again, the ability and permission to issue switch-
off commands to power generators in the user’s home 
is expected to be based on special contracts between 
user and utility operator. 
3) Demand Response 
Another use case from a utility prospect is demand 
response: A utility can send price signals (either a 
rather high price if energy demand is too high or a low 
price if the energy demand is too low) without using 
the energy market to influence energy usage of intelli-
gent home appliances. Price signals are especially 
interesting for energy intensive tasks that have a large 
time window for execution, e.g. charging of electric 
cars. Price signals can be sent for future time periods or 
as real time pricing information. The utility sends price 
signals via the gateway operator to the ICT gateways. 
The ICT gateway may distribute the pricing informa-
tion in the home to the appropriate home appliances or 
act on the pricing information based on defined pro-
files. 
III. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ICT GATEWAY ACCESS 
As described above, the secure discovery and access 
to a home energy gateway is a central functionality for 
a secure smart energy grid. Based on the described 
scenarios, the following entities may require secure 
access, via both local and remote communication, to an 
ICT gateway: 
− Energy provider (including metering / billing) 
− Distribution network operator 
− Gateway operator 
− Energy Market 
− End user 
Therefore an ICT gateway has to support remote ac-
cess, allowing secure exchange of measurement, super-
vision and control data with the energy network. Secure 
access involves the following parts: 
− Authentication: Mutual authentication between 
ICT gateway and accessing entity. 
− Authorization: Determine access permissions. The 
decision whether a certain access is authorized, 
may be decided locally on the device or centrally 
by an authorization server. The access control en-
forcement takes place at the gateway itself.  
− Secure Communication: Confidentiality and Integ-
rity of the communication is protected, e.g., by us-
ing IPsec or SSL/TLS.  
The following subsections discuss the different as-
pects for the realization of secure access to an ICT 
gateway and propose an appropriate solution. 
A. Platform Security 
It is expected that the ICT gateway itself supports 
certain security features. These may comprise: 
— Secure credential store for storing user or service 
relate credentials. These may be issued by the 
gateway service provider or even the energy pro-
vider himself. A flexible approach for providing a 
secure credential store is the use of pluggable se-
curity modules, e.g. in form of a smart card. Simi-
lar to a mobile phone SIM card, the user can then 
simply change his energy provider by replacing the 
energy provider’s security module. 
— Self-integrity check to ensure that the system con-
figuration has not been altered in an unauthorized 
way 
— Tamper protection to detect if changes to the 
hardware have been made.  
The latter feature is especially important if the ICT 
gateway provides information for billing, is part of a 
smart meter device, or is mounted in a place, which are 
publically accessible.  
B. Network Connectivity 
One requirement arising from these use cases is scal-
ability. Security solutions for the Smart Grid must scale 
with millions of devices – Germany for example has 
more than 39 million households and each household is 
likely to have more than one device.  
Users will connect their ICT gateways to already ex-
isting ICT networks, which are used for Internet access 
and services like Voice over IP (VoIP) or multimedia 
streaming. The user infrastructure typically involves a 
gateway connecting to the Internet (DSL box), which 
has a Network Address Translation (NAT) component 
as well as a firewall component integrated. Thus, ac-
cessibility of an ICT gateway connected to a user’s 
home network is limited, as the ICT gateway is not 
addressable from outside. Hence, another requirement 
is NAT-traversal (the ability to address and reach a 
component behind a NAT device). 
Multiple levels of hierarchy from a control station to 
a device in a household are a common solution to ad-
dress scalability.  This includes communication other 
than the point to point communication used today.  
A solution that enables NAT-traversal is described 
below. 
C. ICT Gateway Discovery  
As shown in Figure 1, in smart grid scenario’s new 
roles and/or components may be introduced. One ex-
ample is the ICT gateway operator. This gateway op-
erator is in charge of concentrating the communication 
from the home energy gateways up to the control center 
as well as providing an easy way to the control center 
to reach a high number of energy gateways at once. 
Moreover, a gateway operator can support the discov-
ery of ICT gateways and most likely will also offer 
additional services based on this discovery like remote 
access for user’s or remote management of the ICT 
gateways, e.g., to provide enhanced functionality or 
updates for installed software. 
D. Permissions 
The following permissions resp. kinds of access to 
the ICT gateway have to be distinguished: 
o Change configuration 
o Install applications 
o Get status information 
o Issue commands (e.g. shutoff command) 
E. Access Authentication 
Access to the home energy gateway should be lim-
ited to a distinct group of entities, which may comprise 
the distribution network operator, the gateway operator, 
and the user itself. Moreover, communication with the 
gateway should be performed in a secure manner. Both 
can be achieved as described in the following: 
− Gateways possess a certificate, which was either 
provided by the vendor of the gateway or the gate-
way operator. 
− Roles or components accessing the gateway also 
possess a public resolvable certificate and corre-
sponding private key. 
− Mutual authentication between gateway and ac-
cessing component/role based on credentials is 
performed. 
− Home energy gateways are not always reachable 
from the Internet, i.e. they may not use a public IP 
address. 
− The IP address may be resolved by the gateway 
operator directly or by a network operator (in case 
of DSL at the users home) if requested by other 
smart grid entities  
In the following options for the access decision 
points are discussed. 
F. Local access control decision at the ICT gateway 
To ensure a secure communication of roles/persons 
allowed to access the home gateway, an access control 
list (containing credentials, potentially role informa-
tion, associated rights, etc.) has to be managed at the 
gateway directly. This may be done by either the user 
or the gateway operator. As the user has the choice of a 
preferred energy provider, service aggregator or other 
smart grid roles, there will be individual communica-
tion connections per user. Thus user-specific configura-
tion has to be done at each home energy gateway. 
Dedicated roles can initiate a secure connection to 
every ICT gateway based on a device certificate in-
stalled at the gateway. 
The advantage of this approach is a direct accessibil-
ity for different roles or components to the ICT gate-
way. The disadvantage is that user specific connection 
credentials have to be administered at each ICT gate-
way separately. Note that the gateway discovery and 
address resolution is neglected here. Deployment in 
existing home environments may not lead to the estab-
lishment of a communication channel through the exis-
tence of NAT and Firewall functionality. Thus, the 
approach of direct access is not feasible. 
G. Centralized access control decision 
An alternative to the decentralized handling of ac-
cess control is a central, network-based functionality of 
a security provider, who authenticates and authorizes 
potential roles and components, that wish to access an 
ICT gateway. Such an approach is already known from 
telecommunication environments like the Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) of 3GPP networks. 
A further example can be given through server compo-
nents in voice over IP (VoIP) networks, e.g., in SIP 
(Session Initiation Protocol, RFC 3261). The following 
section investigates in centralized access control. 
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR CENTRALIZED ACCESS CONTROL  
The proposed central security function provides Au-
thentication – Session Invocation – Authorization. 
Hence the abbreviation ASIA is used further on for this 
component. ASIA would be typically combined with 
other functions needed, e.g., for the address resolution 
or ICT gateway discovery. It is therefore expected that 
the ICT gateways register with the ASIA component to 
publish their IP addresses. This registration connection 
is kept online to allow access to the ICT gateway from 
remote and may also be used to communicate con-
sumption data or to connect to value added services. As 
it is expected that the ICT gateway is operated in a 
home environment behind the DSL router, this perma-
nent connection also keeps the NAT bindings as well as 
the opened communication ports in the DSL router. To 
achieve connectivity with an ICT gateway using ASIA 
different modes are described in the following subsec-
tions. 
A. ASIA – Operation in Session Invocation Mode  
In this mode, ASIA initiates a connection establish-
ment with requesting smart grid role/component. 
Process: 
− ASIA authenticates and authorizes the connecting 
smart grid role/component (energy provider, ag-
gregator, meter data management, etc.) 
− Accessing role/component provides a TAN (trans-
action number) for the ICT gateway to associate 
the ICT gateway in the direct connection later on. 
Alternatively, the TAN may be generated by ASIA 
and provided to the accessing role/component and 
the ICT gateway as part of a software token. This 
has the advantage that the software token may con-
tain further information about security parameter 
of the connection to be established between the 
ICT gateway and the accessing role/component. 
Examples are the fingerprints of the used certifi-
cates for authentication at ASIA. 
− ASIA sends the connection request from the 
role/component via the permanent connection to 
the ICT gateway including the connection parame-
ter (address of role/component, TAN, software to-
ken, etc.) and optionally the requested command to 
be executed. 
− The ICT gateway uses the received information to 
establish a direct connection to the requesting 
role/component. The distributed TAN can be used 
to associate the connection attempt with the initial 
request of the requesting role/component.  
− After successful authentication as part of the direct 
connection, the information exchange can be 
started. 
Technical approach: 
− If web-based services are already used in the sys-
tem the authorization process may be realized us-
ing SAML and XML security (cf. [3]). This ap-
proach supports certificate based authorization as 
well as pre-shared key based authorization.  
− An alternative to SAML may be the application of 
Kerberos for a purely symmetric infrastructure 
without the need for certificates. 
− Authentication on the direct connection may be 
performed on transport layer, e.g., by applying 
TLS. 
The following figure shows the general protocol 
flow for a session invocation. 
 
Smart Grid Role ICT Gateway 
ASIA 
Registration 
Request ICT 
Gateway + TAN 
Request (Role) + 
TAN + Token 
Request to Gateway for  
data or commands  
 Authentication  
    against ASIA 
 Connection request from smart 
grid role  authenticated and 
authorized via ASIA 
 Token contains connection 
and security parameter and 
optional authorization result 
 TAN (optional) for response 
correlation on requester side  
 Optional command submission 
as part of the request 
Connection establishment with role, according to 
description in token + TAN  
Data exchange (commands, values)  
Response + Token 
 
Figure 2: ASIA – Session Invocation Mode 
The advantage of this approach is the flexibility and 
scalability in changing environments, especially in 
when the communication relations change. The ap-
proach supports a central authentication and authoriza-
tion component, which keeps the administrative effort 
low per gateway. This may influence the used gateway 
hardware.  The central component is not involved in 
the actual data exchange. The disadvantage is that there 
is no option for a direct communication establishment 
between the requesting role/component and the ICT 
gateway, which stems from the user environment, be-
cause of the missing TAN.  
B. ASIA – Operation in Redirect Mode 
In this mode the ASIA server provides the address 
location information to the requestor after successful 
authentication. The requestor can then directly connect 
to the ICT gateway. 
Process: 
− The ASIA component authenticates the requesting 
smart grid role/component based upon certificates 
or pre-shared keys alternatively.  
− According to the ASIA rule set, the address infor-
mation will be provided to the requesting 
role/component. Here, it is also possible to include 
a software token as proof that the role/component 
has been authenticated and authorized at the ASIA 
server. This token may include further security pa-
rameter. 
Technical approach: 
Based on the described functionality, the ASIA 
server would resemble a Kerberos like KDC authenti-
cating and authorizing the access to the ICT gateway. 
Note that this approach builds upon the general acces-
sibility of the ICT gateway in terms of addressing and 
connection establishment, which may be limited due to 
the user’s environment. 
The following figure depicts the general call flow. 
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Figure 3: ASIA – Redirect Mode 
The advantage of this approach is the flexibility to 
react on changing communication relations. Like the 
previous approach this solution allows for a central 
authentication and authorization component. The obvi-
ous disadvantage is the requirement to have direct 
accessibility to the ICT gateway from other compo-
nents. In user environments with NAT and FW devices, 
this solution will fail, as the Firewall will block access 
to the ICT gateway. Moreover, if the user has a com-
mon DSL account the associated IP address is likely to 
change within 24 hours (at least in Germany).  
C. ASIA – Operation in Proxy Mode 
The ASIA server may act as proxy for restricting ac-
cess to the ICT gateway. 
Process: 
− The ASIA component authenticates the requesting 
role/component based upon certificates or pre-
shared keys alternatively.  
− Based on the permanent connection between the 
ICT gateway and the ASIA server, the connection 
attempt of the requesting role/component is for-
warded to the ICT gateway.  
− ASIA may provide information about the authenti-
cation and authorization state, in a software token. 
− To achieve end-to-end security also in the case of a 
communication proxy, application layer security 
mechanisms may be used.  An example is the ap-
plication of XML signatures to achieve integrity 
protection.  
Technical approach: 
− ASIA simply connects both links and operates as a 
data proxy for the duration of the connection. 
This approach may be realized by using the previ-
ously described approach, with the exception, that 
ASIA does deliver the own address instead of provid-
ing the ICT gateway address. It may be realized with 
the first approach letting the ASIA server connect to 
the requesting role/component. Thus, this approach is 
rather a configuration of the first two approaches with 
central access control. 
The following figure shows the abstract call flow or 
the connection establishment. 
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Figure 4: ASIA – Proxy Mode 
The advantage of this approach is the flexibility to 
react on changing communication relations. A disad-
vantage is the missing end to end connection estab-
lishment. Moreover, as all traffic is processed though 
the ASIA server, dedicated hardware requirements may 
arise.   
Generally, the ASIA functionality can also be used 
to deliver configuration information, which communi-
cation connections are allowed or normal and which 
not. This configuration information can also be used to 
enrich the effectiveness of IDS/IPS tools, by making 
them aware of the network configuration.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides an overview of smart grid envi-
ronment and challenges. Many future use cases in the 
smart grid are centered on the smart home. An intelli-
gent ICT gateway is the key to provide the intended 
services. Nevertheless, the base for the service provi-
sioning is connectivity. This paper described ap-
proaches to protect access and data exchange, prevent-
ing manipulation of ICT gateway operation. It pre-
sented an ASIA (Authentication, Session Invocation, 
Authorization) component to be used in the smart grid 
environments to protect access to energy appliances at 
a user’s home from remote and to cope with basic 
problems like ICT gateway discovery and addressing. 
Three different modes of operation allow the ASIA 
component to be adapted to a very large range of smart 
grid communication network settings. The concept of 
ASIA was also introduced into the E-DeMa project (cf. 
[5]), which is one of six projects funded by the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technologies 
(BMWi) in the national joint research initiative E-
Energy. 
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